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Disunion follows the Civil War as it unfolded.
At the beginning of November 1864, Col. Benjamin J. Sweet, the commandant
of the Camp Douglas prisoner-of-war camp near Chicago and commander of the
Army post of Chicago, began to hear reports of large numbers of men arriving on
trains from Southern Illinois and now milling around the streets and saloons.
Detectives also noted that men known to be officers in the Confederate States
Army lodged in Chicago hotels. Army detectives working for other commands
likewise confirmed the presence of rebel officers in the city.
With permission from the War Department in Washington, Sweet detailed
one of his camp's 8,000 prisoners, John T. Shanks, a now-pro-Union rebel from
Texas, to nose around the city to see what was afoot. Posing as an escaped
prisoner, on Nov. 3 Shanks first went to Judge Buckner S. Morris's house and
spoke with the judge and his wife, Mary, both of whom the Army knew had aided
rebel prisoners in escaping. Judge Morris confided to Shanks that there soon
would be an uprising in the city.
Three days later Shanks made his way to the Richmond House hotel, where he
found Confederate officers he knew from their days under Gen. John Hunt
Morgan, the Confederate raider. A few of them spilled that an attack on Camp
Douglas was planned for Election Day, Nov. 8, led by a Confederate agent, Capt.
Thomas Henry Hines. Hines and local armed collaborators would attack the camp
from the outside, while prisoners would rise up inside. Freed and armed, the rebel
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prisoners, aided by sympathetic allies, would then ravage the city and state and
disrupt the Union war effort. Shanks reported this information to Camp Douglas
commanders.
This wasn't the first such plot Sweet had heard about. In previous months he
had become aware of the threats to Camp Douglas from combined efforts oflocal
secret anti-government organizations and Confederate agents who were keen to
release thousands of rebel troops held in northern prison camps. Initially, he had
dismissed or ignored information about collusion between Chicagoans and
prisoners. For instance, in May, Army officers in Kentucky had interrogated a
recaptured rebel escapee from Camp Douglas, who told them that Chicago
"copperheads" gave money and horses to escaped men and were led by a man
named Walsh, who employed his young daughter to smuggle messages to
prisoners. But evidently Sweet failed to act on this information.
Then, in August, a disgruntled rebel officer in Windsor, Ontario, approached
the Army commander in Detroit with news that Captain Hines planned to lead an
attack on Camp Douglas later that month, during the Democratic National
Convention in Chicago. Alerted, Sweet hired detectives to locate the Confederates
in the city, but the sleuths failed to find them. As Sweet reported, he acknowledged
that a secret organization indeed existed in the city, but he didn't think it was
armed or plotting "open armed hostility." If they were up to no good, he said, "I
have not yet been able to detect it."
Acting on reports from other sources, however, higher-ups in the Army chain
of command took the threat more seriously, and reinforced the Camp Douglas
garrison as a precaution. As it turned out, Hines and other Confederates had
filtered into Chicago during the convention hubbub and were poised to lead local
armed conspirators in an attack, but the locals, led by a man named Charles
Walsh, got cold feet at the last minute. Frustrated, Hines sent most of his force
back to Canada, while he and about 25 others scattered across Southern Illinois to
recruit men for another attempt.
Sweet then hired more detectives and assiduously worked to uncover plots. As
he later reported, his spies inside the camp got wind of a plan to overpower the
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Camp Douglas garrison on Sept. 19, timed to coincide with the Confederate seizure
of the Philo Parsons steamship in Lake Erie in a plot to attack the Union warship
Michigan, and free Confederate officers held on Johnson's Island. But prisoners
saw his beefed up defenses and called off the effort.
Accordingly, experience told Colonel Sweet that the presence of Confederate
officers in city hotels boded ill. On the evening of Nov. 6, Sweet chose to act
decisively. Sending a courier by rail to Springfield to alert his immediate
commander, he warned that Chicago was filled with "suspicious characters,"
among them Captain Hines and other Confederates who had been there in August.
The danger was too great to wait for orders. Sweet planned, he reported, "to arrest
these officers, if possible before morning. The head gone we can manage the
body." He intended also to arrest "prominent citizens" who were part of the plot,
"of which the proof is ample."
In the pre-dawn hours of Monday, Nov. 7, troops from Camp Douglas
marched into Chicago, spread out and arrested Confederate officers in the
Richmond House. Sweet posted guards around citizens' houses and arrested their
occupants, among them Judge Morris and Charles Walsh, whom Sweet would
later identify as the treasurer and brigadier general respectively of the local Sons
of Liberty lodge. Acting on information, at 3 a.m. troops surrounded a house
where Thomas Henry Hines was known to be staying. But the Confederate agent
escaped capture by climbing into the bed of the house's residents. Claiming to be
ill, the lady of the house stayed in bed all day and shielded Hines in the bedclothes.
Not finding Hines, officers relieved the guard the following evening and Hines
slipped out of the house and Chicago and made his way to Cincinnati, where he hid
with friends.
As day broke, Chicagoans awoke in astonishment to see troops and ad hoc
militia cavalry patrolling the streets, armed with the hundreds of loaded revolvers
and shotguns (intended to arm the freed prisoners) seized at Charles Walsh's
house. Fearing that an uprising might still occur, commanders requested and
received reinforcements from other Army posts in the Midwest. In the following
days, troops and detectives arrested and interrogated nearly 100 men in the city
and downstate Illinois towns; their stories confirmed that the conspiracy aimed to
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release the P.O.W.s in Camp Douglas. During this crisis, Chicagoans went to the
polls on Election Day to cast their ballots.
National military and political leaders put the arrested Confederate officers
and Chicago civilians on trial by military commission, which was held at Army
department headquarters in Cincinnati in the first months of 1865. The trial
functioned as a sequel to the military commission trials of the Indiana
conspirators held in Indianapolis in late 1864, during the run-up to the fall state
and federal elections. The Cincinnati trial of the Chicago conspirators - including
Buckner Morris and Charles Walsh - lacked the election-propaganda impact of
the Indianapolis trials, but helped the Lincoln administration portray opposition
Democrats as traitors, and underscored the boiling tensions that defined the
Midwestern states throughout the war.
Follow Disunion at twitter.com/NYTcivilwar or join us on Facebook.
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